CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLAINT AS AN INSTRUMENT OF INDIRECT LOBBYING IN THE LAW-MAKING PROCESS

Abstract

The purpose of the article is to develop a theoretical understanding of the constitutional complaint as a form of indirect (judicial) lobbying and as an instrument for influencing the law-making process. Particular attention is paid to identifying the functional characteristics of individual applications as instruments for the realization of collective interests in modern legal systems.

The methodological framework is based on a combination of general scientific and special legal methods. A systemic approach was applied to determine the place of judicial procedures within the law-making mechanism. Comparative legal analysis was used to generalize scholarly approaches to the interaction between interest groups and public authority. In addition, a structural and functional method was employed to establish the role of individual applications in the process of normative change. Theoretical generalization enabled the integration of findings from various scientific traditions into a unified analytical model.

The study formulates a generalized definition of indirect judicial influence as a specific form of realization of organized interests through procedural mechanisms. It is established that such procedures may perform not only a rights-protection function but also a regulatory function, contributing to the transformation of the legal environment. A systematization of the principal directions of such influence is proposed, covering socially oriented, economic, politically motivated, and value-driven forms of activity. It is substantiated that the multidimensional nature of these manifestations necessitates the development of criteria for their admissibility and limits of application.

It is demonstrated that the use of constitutional review instruments as channels for the realization of interests may significantly affect the content of regulatory frameworks and the formation of legal standards. At the same time, the lack of sufficient institutional clarity of these mechanisms creates risks of imbalance between private and public interests. The necessity of developing procedural safeguards and establishing a comprehensive conceptual framework for regulating these processes is substantiated, which will contribute to strengthening the principles of legal certainty and stability of the legal system.